Finance and Corporate Governance
Code: 41983 ECTS Credits: 10| Degree | Type | Year | Semester |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4311312 Management, Organization and Business Economics | OB | 0 | 1 |
Contact
- Name:
- Florina Raluca Silaghi
- Email:
- Florina.Silaghi@uab.cat
Use of Languages
- Principal working language:
- english (eng)
Prerequisites
No previous requirements are needed, although some general knowledge in statistics and optimization are welcome.
Objectives and Contextualisation
This module wants first to provide a relatively non-technical approach to modern microeconomic theory, and after that, it covers the major topics in corporate finance and corporate governance theory, with an emphasis on recent contributions and research questions. The main message we want to get through is that many situations can best be analyzed by (1) thinking about what's really going on in the "real world", (2) making use of the tools of microeconomics to re-interpret the problem and develop a simple model, and (3) thinking carefully about how to solve the model. For the first part, this will be illustrated in several areas, including information problems, certain aspects of monopoly theory, and oligopoly theory. The student will learn the topics covered in a traditional course such as: consumer theory, firms’ decision-making and market structure, general equilibrium as well as information theory. The student will handle mathematical techniques for dealing with these issues. Therefore, by the end of the module the student will have enough bases to rigorously approach all sorts of topics covered in business strategy, corporate governance, finance and the theory of organizations.
For the remaining parts, this module covers the major topics in corporate finance, finance and corporate governance theory, with an emphasis on recent contributions and research questions. Having the students basic notions in finance, contract theory and game theory, the course will specially focus on corporate governance problems. The lectures will be on financial contracting under asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, control and corporate governance, and financial intermediation.
Competences
- Analyse the behaviour and the interrelationships among the different agents interested in the company's future.
- Develop a critical and a constructive attitude to one's work and that of others.
- Develop an ethical, social and environmental commitment.
- Display knowledge of the economic and institutional environment in which the economic agents interact within, or through, economic organisations.
- Explain and motivate the analyses, interpret the results and present all these clearly and concisely in English.
- Identify the relevant sources of information and their content for subsequent analysis.
- Leadership and decision-taking capability.
- Make use of quantitative documentary sources that are significant for the economic analysis of organisations from a critical perspective.
- Master the technical and IT tools needed to carry out applied studies.
- Present research results to various audiences using the different media available.
- Understand qualitative models of the firm and interpret their results.
- Work in multidisciplinary international teams.
Learning Outcomes
- Develop a critical and a constructive attitude to one's work and that of others.
- Develop an ethical, social and environmental commitment.
- Explain and motivate the analyses, interpret the results and present all these clearly and concisely in English.
- Identify the characteristics of the different agents linked to the company.
- Identify the relevant sources of information and their content for subsequent analysis.
- Know and distinguish the characteristics of the different business databases.
- Know the different models of corporate governance.
- Leadership and decision-taking capability.
- Master the technical and IT tools needed to carry out applied studies.
- Present research results to various audiences using the different media available.
- Show mastery of the characteristics of the financial markets.
- Understand and show mastery of the relationship with the firm.
- Understand the current models of microstructure.
- Understand the determining factors of government structures.
- Work in multidisciplinary international teams.
Content
The first part of the module will approach topics covered in a traditional Microeconomics course. The student will handle mathematical techniques for dealing with these issues. For the remaining parts, this course covers topics on finance and corporate finance, corporate governance, and some recent contributions and research questions.
The module have been divided in four parts: microeconomics, finance, corporate governance and additional research topics.
The following topics will be covered in Economics of Markets (Microeconomics):
1. Economics as a Behavioral Science. See how economists might think about a variety of problems
2. Consumer Behavior and Choice under Uncertainty
3. Production Theory and Production Costs
4. Profit Maximization and Monopoly
5. Oligopoly Theory
6.Information Economics
7. Information Economics. An Institutional Approach.
The following topics will be covered in Finance and Markets:
8. Risk, return and diversification
9. Portfolio theory
10. Simplifying portfolio theory
11. The capital asset pricing model
12. Valuing real assets
13. Capital structure
The following topics will be covered in Corporate Governance:
14. Introducing Capital Structure: Modigliani-Miller Theorems
15. Bankruptcy Costs and Debt Holder – Equity Holder Conflicts
16. Capital Structure and Corporate Strategy
17. Ownership and Control
18. Corporate governance and performance
19. Regulation and best practice codes
The following topics will be covered in the Seminar in Finance and Markets:
20. Market efficiency: Theory and empirical evidence
21. Behavioral Finance.
22. Financial Risks: Measures of credit risk
A detailed description of their contents can be found: http://pagines.uab.cat/mmobe/
Methodology
The module combines theoretical lectures and practical sessions that require the dynamic participation of students. Learning activities include: following lectures on the main topics, solving and handling problem sets and computer exercises, reading and critical reviewing of papers. All this is an interactive fashion. Case preparations and in-class discussions will also become important benchmarks of student progress. In-class discussions give students an opportunity to apply material from the class to real-world problems. Other class sessions will be primarily dedicated to lecture material and shorter discussions.
Activities
| Title | Hours | ECTS | Learning Outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Type: Directed | |||
| Directed | 100 | 4 | 8, 14, 7, 6, 2, 13, 12, 4 |
| Type: Supervised | |||
| Supervised | 25 | 1 | 15, 10, 1, 9, 11, 5 |
| Type: Autonomous | |||
| Autonomous | 85 | 3.4 | 6, 2, 1, 11, 12, 3 |
Assessment
The evaluation system of the module includes:
- Assignments (solving problems sets, presentation of critical reviewing of papers, final essay)
- Class Participation (case and news discussion, short debates)
- Test (midterm and final exam)
The student will pass the module when the final mark is equal or higher than five (over ten).
Assessment Activities
| Title | Weighting | Hours | ECTS | Learning Outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignments | 40 | 16 | 0.64 | 15, 14, 6, 9, 13, 12, 4, 5 |
| Class Participation | 10 | 4 | 0.16 | 8, 10, 2, 1, 3 |
| Exams | 50 | 20 | 0.8 | 14, 7, 2, 11, 12, 3 |
Bibliography
Bibliography:
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